After an impressive start to their rookie season, the expectations at Toyota rose quickly, and dangerously. Now, near the end of their first year of Grand Prix racing, Karl Ludvigsen has some advice for the heads of the Japanese giant

Mr. Fujio Cho
President
Toyota Motor Corporation
4-18 Koraku, 1-Chome
Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo 12
Japan

Subject: Toyota's Formula One Racing Program

Dear Cho-san,

I realise that you and your colleagues must be disappointed by the way things turned out at the Italian Grand Prix at Monza. Your cars were on the very brink of a great success. At various times both drivers were racing in the top six; you had every chance of placing both your cars in the points. This, however, was destined not to be. Both car and driver problems contributed to a disappointing result. My reason for writing, therefore, is to urge you to take heart. For your team has already accomplished far more in 2002 than anyone outside Toyota had anticipated.

It has come to my attention that expectations inside Toyota have risen, almost certainly to unrealistic heights. The main reason for this was the early scoring of points with sixth-place finishes in Australia and Brazil. After Australia your Mr. Tsutomu Tomita, Chairman of Toyota Motorsport GmbH and leader of the Toyota F1 team, said he was "extremely pleased. This is just the best result for us." I fear that in fact it was not the best possible result.

I must remind you of the start of the 1989 season. A friend of mine from my Fiat days, Cesare Fiorio, had just taken over as team manager for Ferrari. The team raced in the first event of the year, in Brazil, with a brand-new car, the hitherto-troublesome Tipo 640. Incredibly they were the winners, with Nigel Mansell driving. I sent a note of commiseration to my friend Fiorio, saying that I felt sorry for him because this was the worst possible result, raising the expectations of Fiat and Ferrari unrealistically high for the rest of the season. In this I was quite correct.

Before the 2002 season began, your Mr. Ove Andersson sought to keep expectations at a low level. "We will be happy just to qualify," he said in essence. This was in fact a valid position for a team completely new to Formula One. Many have not even overcome that initial hurdle. Beyond that his expressed aim was to finish races in order to gain the experience of the various circuits that is so important. Unfortunately for Andersson-san, your cars finished in the points in two races early in the year.

"Scoring points early raised the expectations of our top executives in Japan," Andersson-san told Autosport, "and of the worldwide Toyota family. It raised their hopes to such an extent that I think everybody is disappointed that we haven't achieved more. I understand their reaction, but I do not think they understand fully the difficulties of being successful in Formula One."

It is not easy to understand those difficulties. And I hope you will not be offended if I point out that the profiles of your fellow senior Toyota executives offers little hope that they will have great sympathy for the problems faced by your Formula One team. You yourself have come up through the manufacturing and planning ranks of Toyota. The same holds true of most of your executive vice presidents. Only one of them, Akihiko Saito, is a graduate engineer who has worked in engineering and product-planning posts and who now chairs your Motorsport Committee. He-and he alone-is well able to comprehend the technical challenge that Formula One presents. Saito-san will face a difficult task in communicating this to you and to his fellow vice presidents. I wish him every success.

I would like to express some concern about the decision to change both drivers for 2003. In Formula One racing, few success factors are more important than continuity of staff. Learning must be kept and treasured within the organisation. The drivers are key members of that staff. "The decision wasn't only mine," said Andersson-san, "it was an agreement between the Toyota Motor Corporation in Japan and us, Toyota Motorsport." With respect, Cho-san, such decisions should lie chiefly with the team. They are the people who know the situation best and who must stand or fall on the basis of their choices.

I think I have a sense of the reason for your letting Mika Salo go. He may have been too outspoken about the challenge that Toyota faces. "The car is much better for next year already," he said recently, "but it will still be a couple of years before there are good results." That may be the kind of language that your colleagues don't like. They may want more success sooner. But it happens to be correct. Good results will not come consistently for several years yet. Please try to condition yourself and your management team to this unalterable reality, so that your team can operate in a realistic environment.

At the beginning of this season I made this comment about the prospects for your team:

"Only one thing worries me. Toyota never won Le Mans. As long ago as 1992 Toyota was second at Le Mans. In 1993 it was fourth, and in 1994 it was second again. In 1998 it placed ninth at Le Mans and in 1999 it was second once more. Then Toyota gave up. Instead of pressing on to win the race in which it had invested so much time, energy and money, it quit. This is not a good sign. This suggests to me that Toyota was racing at Le Mans because it thought that it was a good thing to do from a public relations standpoint, not because it thought that winning was important."